Edgar Zilsel’s Philosophy of Science in Context(s)

Edgar Zilsel's relationship to the Vienna Circle is in many respects ambivalent. Although he participated frequently in its meetings, he maintained a critical distance from the group. While he shared some central tenets of their philosophy, his views on epistemology, the role of logic in philosophical inquiry, and the commitments that he thought come with being an empiricist differed remarkably from those of other members of the Vienna Circle.
This contribution tries to shed some light on this complicated relationship by examining in detail Zilsel's position within the famous "protocol-sentence debate" (Uebel 2007). It will become apparent not only that Zilsel has attempted to develop an original position (Zilsel 1932)  on protocols, somewhere located between Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick, but also that this position is quite substantially dependent on his earlier philosophical work, particularly on Das Anwendungsproblem (Zilsel 1916). This not only reveals interesting continuities in the development of Zilsel's thinking but also outlines a broader and unfinished philosophical project.


References
Uebel, Thomas. 2007. Empiricism at the Crossroads. The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate. Chicago: Open Court.
Zilsel, Edgar. 1916. Das Anwendungsproblem. Leipzig: Barth.Zilsel, Edgar. 1932. "Bemerkungen Zur Wissenschaftslogik." Erkenntnis 3: 143–61.

Whether someone can be considered "a political philosopher of science" very much depends on the criteria that one takes as a normative standard for this definition. In this contribution, I would like to show how Zilsel's work can be regarded as a prime example of a politically engaged philosophy of science both according to the criteria formulated in Romizi (2012) with reference to the Vienna Circle's "scientific world-conception", and to most criteria formulated by Schlaudt (2018). In fact, Zilsel's philosophy of science and Zilsel's political commitment were two expressions (enactments) of the same attitude, which he supported publicly, and which had a clear political meaning at that time. Moreover, his involvement in the Social-Democratic party was essentially related to his work and position as a philosopher of science. To support my theses, I will draw in particular on Zilsel's writings preceding his forced emigration (e.g. Zilsel 1916, 1918, 1926/1972, 1927, 1931a, 1931b, 1932).


References
Romizi, Donata. 2012. „The Vienna Circle's ‚Scientific World-Conception': Philosophy of Science in the Political Arena". HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 2012): 205-242.Schlaudt, Oliver. 2018. „A Political Meaning of 'Scientific Philosophy'? The Case of Edgar Zilsel". Philosophia Scientiae. Travaux d'historie et de philosophie des sciences, 257-287.Zilsel, Edgar. 1916. Das Anwendungsproblem. Leipzig: Barth.Zilsel, Edgar. 1918/1990. Die Geniereligion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Zilsel, Edgar. 1926/1972. Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffes. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Antike und des Frühkapitalismus, Hildesheim – New York: Olms.  Zilsel, Edgar. 1927. „Über die Asymmetrie und die Einsinnigkeit der Zeit". Die Naturwissenschaften, 12: 280-286.Zilsel, Edgar. 1931a/1992: „Materialismus und marxistische Geschichtsauffassung", in: E. Zilsel, Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung. Aufsätze 1929-1933, ed. G. Mozetič, Wien / Köln / Weimar: BöhlauZilsel, Edgar. 1931b/1992. „Partei, Marxismus, Materialismus, Neukantismus", in: E. Zilsel, Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung. Aufsätze 1929-1933, ed. G. Mozetič, Wien / Köln / Weimar: BöhlauZilsel, Edgar. 1932. „Das mechanistische Weltbild und seine Überwindung". Der Atheist, 9: 129-131